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(Fachkha et al., 2012). Other research 
examines how to create a sense of threat or 
fear in others (Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2013; 
Peters, Ruiter & Kok, 2014). Further, although 
a variety of forms and contexts of threats are 
reviewed, the focus of this analysis will be on 
interpersonal threats—threats expressed by 
one person to another person. Finally, the 
interest of this analysis is more on identifying 
linguistic threats themselves, rather than 
identifying the threatener (see: Abbasi & 
Chen, 2008; Hadjidj et al., 2009), even though 
each of the two approaches may have much to 
offer the other. The purpose of this analysis is 
to examine the nature of expressed threats, 
identify some of their linguistic features 
potentially amenable to machine learning, and 
to provide a rating scale that could assist in 
validating training sets of threats for such 
machine learning and classification. To the 
extent that a reasonably accurate threat 
surveillance system could be developed, it 
could significantly enhance the identification, 
assessment, and potential interventions 
associated with existing case-based threat 
management situations.   
There are laws proscribing communicated 
threats as a particular form of unprotected 
speech (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). The Supreme 
Court, however, when assessing the legality 
and seriousness of threats, tends toward an 
abundance of caution in regulating such 
speech. In recent cases on threats in electronic 
media (e.g., Watts v. United States, and Elonis 
vs. United States), the court has ruled that 
there is an objective intent standard burden of 
proof—the prosecution has an expectation to 
demonstrate a mens rea requirement that the 
communicator intended the message as a 
threat, and that it would be understood by the 
target as a threat (Maras, 2015). Yet, the 
Court has not specified the standard for 
determining what communication features 
constitute a “true threat.” In so doing, the 
Court left the seriousness of threats to be 
determined by their context and the subjective 
intent of the speaker.  
Threat is often associated with fear, dread, 
terror, anxiety, and apprehension (Shen & 
Dillard, 2014), and the sense of threat is no 
doubt an evolved sensitivity with adaptive 
value and neural substrates (Pichon, de Gelder 
& Grèzes, 2009). When uttered or expressed, 
however, threats are a prima facie indicator of 
risk, although not everything perceived as a 
threat or as threatening is predicated on an 
intentional threat message (Rick, Mania, 
Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010; 
Smith & Morra, 1994; Spitzberg, in press; 
Surface, 2011). Threats reveal a complex 
relationship to actual harm. From a forensic 
perspective, threats are generally understood 
as a risk indicator of potentially violent, 
criminal or terrorist behavior (Meloy, 
Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2012). As 
Meloy (2000) pessimistically summarizes: 
“Most individuals do not act on their threats. 
Threats may increase, decrease, or have no 
relationship to subsequent violence” (p. 166). 
The degree to which threats are systematically 
predictive of violence varies from context to 
context. For example, threats are more 
associated with violence in workplace, school, 
and intimate relationships than in public figure 
contexts (Jenkins, 2009). Even among attacks 
on college campuses, threats were apparent in 
only 13% of attacks (U.S. Secret Service, 
2010).  
Other research, however, demonstrates 
some value of threats as predictors of 
subsequent violence. Threats have been 
identified as risk indicators of potentially 
violent, criminal or terrorist behavior (Meloy, 
et al., 2012), stalking (Churcher & Nesca, 
2013; Spitzberg & Cupach, 2014), and femicide 
(Campbell et al., 2003; Glass, Laughon, Rutto, 
Bevacqua & Campbell, 2008). Studies have 
been conducted on threats against stalking 
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2. Negative valence: The act implies some 
harm(s) or undesirable consequence(s) 
to the target(s); 
3. Implicit or explicit issuer control: The 
issuer is actually in control of, and/or 
attempts to communicate self-efficacy 
and control over, the means of the 
occurrence of the harm(s); 
4. Issuer’s Preferred Outcome: The issuer 
suggests or specifies a demand or course 
of action on the part of the target that 
may avert the harm; 
5. Contingency: The issuer suggests or 
specifies that the probability or severity 
of the harm is probabilistically related 
to the target’s behavior. That is, the 
target may avert the harm by 
complying with or fulfilling the issuer’s 
preferred outcome; 
6. Credibility and willingness: The issuer’s 
efficacy (i.e., capability of enacting or 
enabling the harm) and the likelihood 
or probability of instantiating the harm 
are either implied or specified as part of 
the message;  
7. Subjunctive Mood: Threats tend to be 
directed toward future possibilities, 
even though they often refer to past 
perceived wrongs or transgressions, and 
threats may presage future 
contingencies through present action 
(e.g., vandalism in the present may be 
a message of what may happen in the 
future if demands are not met). 
From this pragmatic approach, threats are 
typically conceptualized as a form of 
conditional speech intended to influence or 
gain compliance from a target recipient or 
agent, even when the proximal motive may be 
expressive in nature. Such inquiries have often 
focused on differentiating threats from 
predictions (Kissine, 2008), promises, advice, 
warnings (e.g., López-Rousseau et al., 2011; 
Wood & Quinn, 2003), and anger (Frick, 1986; 
Sinaceur, van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 
2011; Sinaceur & Neal, 2005). For example, 
warnings say that there is a risk of a bad event 
occurring that is not under the control of the 
speaker (as in a friend or family member 
telling their daughter “you are headed for 
trouble” or “anyone who dresses like that is 
asking for it”). In contrast, a threat is a 
statement of a punishment under the control of 
the threatener that is implicitly or explicitly 
contingent upon the noncompliance of the 
target with the threatener’s demands (“if you 
don’t do what I ask, I will make you regret 
it”). 
Another potential asymmetry is between 
promises and threats. Promises tend to 
obligate behavior upon compliance based on 
positively-valenced outcomes, whereas threats 
relinquish the issuer from obligation upon 
compliance based on negatively-valenced 
outcomes, even though in essence, “a threat is 
always accompanied by a promise and vice 
versa, thereby making obligation as 
consubstantial to threats as to promises” 
(Salgueiro, 2010, p. 224; see also Castelfranchi 
& Guerini, 2007). Promises also tend to imply 
an acquiescence of the receiver, who can 
“deactivate” the promise, whereas threats are 
more unilaterally contracted in effect or 
implication (Salgueiro, 2010). Another common 
but not necessary asymmetry is that it is 
common in actual speech for speakers to 
employ the name of the speech act in their 
speech (e.g., “I promise you that…,” “I’m 
warning you…,” “My advice is to…,” etc.), 
whereas issuers rarely use the word “threat” in 
their spoken or written threats, although 
targets may tend to apply the label to the act 
or use it as a credibility marker (e.g., “This is 
no idle threat I’m making”). Furthermore, 
recipients may often label the speech act in 
context (e.g., “Are you threatening me?”). 
There may be typological differences across 
certain contexts of threats. For example, 
JDFSL V1
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and imminence (Simons & Tunkel, 2014). 
Schoeneman-Morris et al. (2007) compared 
email to letter threats to members of Congress 
and found that emails were more likely to 
emphasize governmental issues, use obscenity, 
and reveal disorganization in language, and 
less likely to evidence psychological disorders 
or problematic approach behavior. Schoeneman 
et al. (2011) also investigated communication 
features that characterized threateners who 
engaged in problematic approach behavior 
toward political officials. They found that 
approacher communications revealed longer 
handwritten correspondence, references to 
specific events, demands, noting personal 
stressors, violation of their rights, and 
expressing intentions to approach. In contrast, 
threatening language itself was unrelated to 
actual approach.  
Threats no doubt present substantial 
challenges to standardized search and 
identification criteria. Threats, like most 
language, are highly contextual. Consider, for 
example, the following two exchanges between 
hypothetical persons A and B: 
A: I’m having a party at my place on 
Friday. Do you know where I live? 
B: I know where you live. I’ll see you soon. 
 
A: You are frightening me. Leave me alone. 
If I see you again I’ll call the police, I 
swear! 
B: I know where you live. I’ll see you soon.  
The content of B’s speaking turn is 
identical in both interchanges, but clearly 
takes on a more threatening implication in the 
second exchange. Yet, by a priori notions of 
threat, there is little in the explicit or surface 
content of B’s statement that seems 
particularly sinister. Whether or not threat 
content can be identified independent of such 
contextualizing information is an empirical 
question.  
Assuming that threats can be reliably 
identified, the other major challenge is to 
distinguish threats in regard to their 
credibility. Spitzberg and Cupach’s (2014) 
summary of 16 studies of stalker threats 
identified a false positive rate of 60% and a 
false negative rate of 18%, similar to estimates 
by Meloy (1999, 2002) and Resnik (2007). In a 
study of open source lone actor terrorists, 
Meloy and Gill (2016) found that only 22% 
engaged in pre-event warning behaviors that 
were considered directly communicated 
threats. Thus, many threats appear to have 
relatively little relation to the violence they 
portend. The credibility, or seriousness, of 
threats may be highly contextual. The 
prevailing wisdom is that judgments of threat 
message credibility is highly contextual and 
case-specific, requiring intensive evaluation of 
all case materials. There may still be 
significant practical value to more general 
forms of threat message identification in large 
text or ‘big data’ environments.  
Computational linguistics is a rapidly 
advancing field that investigates ways of 
parsing elements of language, usually written 
text, to identify underlying dimensions and 
elements (e.g., Joacchims, 1998; Salton & 
Buckley, 1988). Progress is being accomplished 
in discourse analysis in the discrimination of 
arguments (e.g., Bex, Atkinson & Bench-
Capon, 2014; Faulkner, 2015), narratives 
(Kypridemou & Michael, 2014), beliefs, 
motives, justifications (Prentice, Rayson, & 
Taylor, 2012), emotions (Oster, 2010; 
Westbury, Keith, Briemeister, Hofmann, & 
Jacovs, 2015), conflict (e.g., Kaya, Ozkaptan, 
Salah & Gurgen, 2015), sarcasm (e.g., Kovaz, 
Kreuz, & Riordan, 2013), impoliteness (Marco, 
2008), group formation and membership (Tsou 
et al., 2014), and intention (e.g., Feng, 2015).  
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Only a few computational linguistics 
studies have been applied to threatening 
communications (Carter, 2010, Gales, 2010, 
2011, 2015; Glukhov & Martynova, 2015; 
Smith, 2006, 2008; Tiongco, 2015; Watt, Kelly 
& Llamas, 2013), although several scholars 
have commented on the potential value of such 
analyses on threat messages (e.g., Cohen, 
Johansson, Kaati, & Mork, 2014; Leonard, 
2005/2006; Sanfilippo, 2010). Taylor et al. 
(2013) investigated the emails of “insider 
threats” in a game simulation, and found that 
language became more self-focused, more 
negative in affective tone, and demonstrated 
more cognitive processing load compared to 
normal coworker participants. Glukhov and 
Martynova (2015) selected a corpus of 525 
threats spoken in interpersonal contexts in 
fictional texts. They content-analyzed these 
threats for several features, including the 
nature of the fear appeal implied by the threat. 
They concluded that although threats to 
health or physical security were more 
represented in the corpus, threats to social 
identity were more efficient in achieving 
concessions for the fictional characters.  
Carter (2010) extracted corpora of terrorist 
and non-terrorist threats from public websites. 
The terrorist corpus consisted of 4,059 words, 
and the non-terrorist corpus consisted of 2,172 
words. These two corpora were each 
subdivided into those sentences containing 
clear threatening utterances. Simple word 
count metrics were assessed on pronoun usage 
and sentence structure (negative command, 
command, command-then statements, if-then 
statements, questions, and declarative 
statements). The results are entirely 
descriptive, but showed that the second-person 
nominative pronoun “you” (and lemmatized to 
include “you’ll” and “you’re”) were most 
common. Grammatically, the subjective “I” and 
the objective “you” were the most common uses 
of pronouns. Declarative statements were most 
typical of specific threat grammar (e.g., “Now 
you’re dead!” and “For this and other 
injustices, you will pay the ultimate price!”).  
Glasgow and Schouten (2014) examined a 
corpus of 60 documents sent to judges that 
raised safety concerns. Although only 3 of the 
documents “made clear threats of violence” (p. 
41), 5 had vague threats of violence, and 16 
threatened legal action, and another 8 
threatened reputational attacks. Glasgow and 
Schouten applied a content and word software 
(LIWC; Chung & Pennebaker, 2011; 
Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001; 
http://www.liwc.net/) that seeks evidence of 
emotional states of writers, and a topic model 
that statistically aggregates topical themes 
(e.g., see Weinstein, Frazier, & Bongar, 2009). 
The authors found little ability to differentiate 
serious from non-serious threats, although the 
corpus was recognized as under-powered. 
Sanfilippo, McGrath and Bell (2014) report a 
computer modeling approach using frame 
analysis (Goffman, 1974), in which content 
themes and features are processed from 
terrorist messages, including: (a) moral 
disengagement, (b) message delivery, (c) seek 
resonance, (d) violence and contention, (e) call 
to arms, (f) social isolation, and (g) violation 
of sacred values (see also, Sanfilippo, 2010; 
Sanfilippo, McGrath & Whitney, 2011).  
An ambitious project by Gales (2010a, 
2010b, 2011, 2015) obtained a corpus 
consisting of 470 threat letters from the 
Academy Group, a consulting behavioral 
analysis organization employing former FBI 
Special Agents. The project sought to analyze 
threats through the lens of speaker stance and 
appraisal. Stance represents “the ways in which 
speakers and writers linguistically demonstrate 
their commitment to or attitudes about a 
person or proposition” (Gales, 2011, p. 27). 
Appraisal involves linguistic markers of 
speaker attitude (“how feelings are mapped 
within texts,” p. 30), engagement (“how writers 
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… dialogically position themselves with respect 
to their audience or to propositions referenced 
within the text,” p. 30), and graduation (“to 
demonstrate greater or lesser degrees of 
positive or negative feelings,” p. 30). From this 
perspective, she theorized that “stances relating 
to the emotions of the writer are outlined 
through the systems of attitude, while stances 
relating to the writer’s level of commitment or 
investment are highlighted through the system 
of engagement” (pp. 30-31). Her case studies 
indicated, contrary to common predictions, 
that threatener language demonstrated 
ambivalent attitudes (i.e., disfavor of both the 
target’s and self’s actions) and ambivalent 
graduation (i.e., through heteroglossic 
utterances such as “may”). In a separate 
analysis of 397 threats (128,774 total words) 
from the same source, stance was used to 
differentiate threats in stalking cases, 
harassment cases, and defamation cases. 
Stalking threats were particularly characterized 
by prediction modals of will, would, shall, be 
going to, a strong co-occurrence of these 
predictions modals and pronouns (e.g., I/we, r 
= .88), trigrams (i.e., I will be and I will have 
indicating volition and possessiveness), verb-
controlled that-complement clauses indicating 
certainty (e.g., you know that) and intention 
(e.g., want, need, like). Suggestive of the role 
of the credibility pragmatic of threats, Gales 
(2015) found that “verbs of certainty, which 
are linked to the epistemic function of 
language, are considerably more frequent in all 
categories of threats, in general” (p. 189).  
Smith (2008) examined a corpus of 96 FBI 
threatening communication cases, classified as 
(1) no action by the threatener, (2) stalking or 
approaching, or (3) harmful action. She found 
several language content variables related 
significantly to action taken, including 
threatening to reveal detrimental information, 
threatening to stalk, using persuasion, 
repeatedly mentioned love or marriage or 
romance, used polite threatening tone, and 
words associated with prejudices regarding 
religion. Threat document features also 
predicted action taken, including typed or 
handwritten notes (vs. computer printed) and 
inappropriate capitalization, and using a true 
return address. She has more recently begun to 
incorporate various linguistic metrics into a 
software package for assessing seriousness of 
threats that demonstrates good discriminatory 
power with this same threat corpus (Smith, 
Woyach & O’Toole, 2014). This computational 
linguistic system is most immediately 
exemplary to the current project. It employs 
an algorithm of seven weighted factors 
(www.threattriage.com), some of which can be 
extracted automatically from the language of a 
threat text: prior contacts, paranoid 
expressions, polite tone, mentions of love—
marriage—or romance, specifying the target, 
specifying the harm for the victim, and 
conceptually complex language). The language 
complexity variable is considered an indicator 
of planning capacity, which is interpreted as a 
proxy for intent. These seven factors 
demonstrated significant discrimination of 
threat-to-problematic action or seriousness in a 
data set of 89 FBI threat cases. The threat 
triage system continues to add closed cases to 
refine the algorithm and accuracy of the 
system.  
Also, exemplary of this project’s objectives, 
research by Tiongco (2015) sought to develop 
and validate a more holistic rating scale. The 
Communicated Threat Analysis Scale (CTAS) 
was intended as a holistic rating scale to assess 
the seriousness of a threat. CTAS seeks to 
assess five characteristics associated with 
threats: organization versus disorganization, 
fixation, time imperative, action imperative, 
and focus. Two exemplary closed-case threats 
were used as stimuli, one credible and one not 
credible. The CTAS was also compared to a 
known threat assessment instrument with 
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similar guided holistic subjective format 
(WAVR-21; Meloy, White & Hart, 2013). The 
18-item Likert-type scale demonstrated 
marginal to unacceptable reliability of 
subscales, although the scale and its subscales 
could be argued to be indexes rather than 
scales, thereby not requiring internal 
consistency (Streiner, 2003). Construct validity 
coefficients between the CTAS and the WAVR 
were generally nonsignificant or modest in 
effect size, indicating little evidence of validity 
for the CTAS. There were also few differences 
manifested between the credible and the 
noncredible threat, or between the expert and 
lay raters.    
Van Brunt (2015) also proposed a holistic 
rating scale of written messages. It is 
comprised of five factors, each with multiple 
sub-items: fixation and focus (specification of a 
target), hierarchical thematic content 
(narrative construction of the writer as a 
superior status protagonist), action and time 
imperative (indication of progression toward 
action through chronemic and spatial cues), 
pre-attack planning (subtle or explicit cues 
related to plan details related to threatened 
action), and injustice collecting (indications of 
a scorecard of having been wronged). This 
system is an entirely qualitative rating system, 
although some of its sub-items could be 
generated as template search ontologies or 
linguistic algorithms in big data contexts, such 
as target name repetition, graphic language, 
weapons mentions, and violence (e.g., Purohit 
et al., 2016). Such rating scales may be 
particularly relevant to validating training sets 
of threats for machine learning and 
classification, as well as heuristics for case 
assessment. 
There are probably other relevant features 
not yet identified (Leonard, 2005/2006). For 
example, certain metrics would be calibration-
based, such as sudden pattern changes or 
“bursts” of preoccupation with a particular 
topic, entity or person (Meloy & O’Toole, 
2011). Some forensic approaches capitalize on 
establishing baseline distributions of a given 
communicator, and scan for significant pattern 
deviations or discrepancies (e.g., Abbasi & 
Chen, 2008; Hadjidj, et al., 2009). Pennebaker 
and Chung (2005) demonstrate that there may 
be distinct patterns of affective tone before, 
during, and following a crisis (e.g., a terrorist 
attack). Furthermore, several of these features 
cannot be captured in single messages, but can 
only be validly understood in a broader 
context of a ‘campaign’ or ‘relationship’ in 
which a given message establishes its 
credibility in the context of a broader set of 
message exchanges.  
Threats are clearly complex communicative 
phenomena. In everyday speech, as a 
commissive, threats are most characterized by 
their false positives—a failure to commit an 
act that is promised (Spitzberg & Cupach, 
2014). Such failure pragmatically places them 
more in the role of directive—influence 
attempts (i.e., directives). As such, a failure to 
commit an act is often taken as an ironic sign 
of the effectiveness of the speech act—the 
target’s compliance foregoes the need to enact 
the harm implied by the speech act. Even 
though threats tend to demonstrate very high 
rates of false positives, they may yet reveal 
significant diagnostic and perhaps even 
predictive information about prospective acts 
of aggression. As Smith et al. (2014, p. 322) 
conclude: “A growing body of literature shows 
that a significant minority of threateners do 
approach or become violent subsequent to 
threatening…Research also indicates that the 
way people use language can have value for 
discerning their intent and future actions.”   
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the training set. In the third stage, the 
learning stage, texts in the training set are 
classified according to the social construct, by 
optimizing weights for the features. This stage 
combines two processes, weight assignment 
and feature selection.  In feature selection, 
features may be eliminated to eliminate noise 
or merged to account for feature interactions. 
The difficult part of applying this 
paradigm is stage one, finding useful and 
extractable features. A resource like the LIWC 
dictionary is the endpoint of a process like a 
stage one process, but the features in LIWC 
are only a starting point. Each application has 
its own set of useful features, and some 
demonstrably useful features may involve 
linguistically complex actions such as 
describing financial problems, or announcing a 
significant anniversary, which are SLP 
problems in their own right. An example of an 
approach to stage one is the work of Miah et 
al. (2014), which uses a sentence similarity 
measure to cluster words associated with 
particular stages in child exploitation chats. 
Once words with strong associations with a 
particular stage are found, a LIWC dictionary 
is built, but with new features specific to child 
exploitation chats. 
The threat message literature has identified 
a number of text features, of various levels of 
complexity, which might plausibly play a role 
in a threat assessment classifier, either to 
predict approach or violence. 
Gales (2010a) analyzes threat messages, 
trying to identify those that are most likely to 
produce fear or anxiety in their recipients. A 
corpus-based approach is used to focus on 
what are known as appraisal features, linguistic 
features that express or reveal the author's 
evaluative stance toward the subject. The 
features examined have considerable 
computational potential, because they can be 
extracted with relative ease. They include 
specific trigrams such as "I will have" or "I 
will be", verbs with that-complement clauses, 
prediction modals such as "will", and 
adverbials of stance expressing certainty, 
likelihood, attitude, and style (for example, 
"frankly", "kind of"), and verbs of intention.  
All of Gale’s features are what are referred to 
here as content features. Not all predictive text 
features bear on the content of the text. 
Of the various text variables Smith (2006) 
studies, the following showed some positive 
correlation with subsequent violent action: 
threateners (1) giving their real return address, 
either partial or complete (2) using a 
typewriter, (3) using inappropriate 
capitalization, and (4) handwriting the threat. 
Note that two of the three are non-content 
textual features.  Smith also used software that 
conducted content analysis to identify 
psychological states: Gottshalk’s (2000; 
Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) PCADS and 
Herman's (2003) Profiler Plus. 
Schoeneman-Morris, Scalora, Chang, 
Zimmerman and Garner (2007) discussed 
several text variables of considerable utility in 
predicting approach by the threatener using a 
corpus of threats on members of Congress. 
They identified the following content features 
in order of predictive power: discussion of 
personal themes, making a request for help, 
mention of entitlements owed the subject, 
mentions of matters of finance, discussion of 
injustice, discussion of government policy or 
human rights, identifying oneself, mention of 
stressors, appeals to patriotism, expression of 
an intent to approach, mention of upcoming 
anniversary, and discussion of contact plans. 
Schoeneman et al. also identified some non-
content text features with predictive power, 
including all caps in messages and general 
disorganization of the text. 
Meloy (2011) identified a number of 
features found consistently to predict 
approach. Although focusing on non-text 
features, Meloy does identify several features 
JDFSL V11N3 Toward Online Linguistic Surveillance of Threatening Messages 
Page 56    © 2016 ADFSL 
and communicative properties that might 
possibly be detected automatically, including 
request for help, entitled reciprocity (the claim 
that something is owed the subject), and 
grandiosity (imagined importance, or the wish 
to achieve importance). The first two coincide 
with features discussed by Schoeneman et al. 
(2007). Grandiosity and narcissism open a new 
text domain that may be important. 
Recognizing abstract features of text like 
grandiosity or narcissism may fall between 
personality classification and recognizing 
psychological state. The literature on 
psychological content analysis has addressed 
both classes of problems. In 2005, a pioneering 
work by Argamon et al. (2005/2006) classified 
neuroticism and extraversion using linguistic 
features such as function words, deictics, 
appraisal expressions, and modal verbs. One 
year later, Oberlander and Nowson (2006) 
classified extraversion, stability, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness of blog authors using n-
gram features. Mairesse et al. (2007) reported a 
long list of correlations between the Big Five 
personality traits (Norman 1963) and LIWC 
Features (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth 2001). 
Celli and Rossi (2012) used a very simple list 
of features to try to sort Twitter users into 
three classes (secure, neurotic, and balanced) 
using profile and timeline information. They 
successfully applied several the text features 
from Mairesse et al.’s (2007) data to their 
classification task (Table 4). These features 
may well apply to other psychological 
classification tasks, including recognizing 
grandiosity (e.g., use of exclamation/question 
marks, negative/positive emoticons, and 
number of long words). 
Summarizing, the most promising approach 
to the computational problem of threat 
assessment is some variant of the SLP 
approach. Pursuing this paradigm seriously 
requires significant work on identifying a useful 
feature set. The work on textual threat 
assessment features suggests a number of easily 
extractable text features may be useful, but it 
also suggests that more abstract features may 
help, and abstract features like grandiosity 
pose classification problems of their own. 
Such approaches are distinct from forensic 
efforts to identify threateners (e.g., Abbasi & 
Chen, 2008; Jadjidj et al., 2009). The contrast, 
however, is informative of potential 
connections between the approaches. The term 
stylometric analysis (SA) is generally used for 
text classification focusing on identifying some 
property of the author of a text, such as level 
of linguistic competence, gender, psychological 
profile, or just the author's identity. SA has 
played a role in Psychology, Language 
Pedagogy, Forensic Analysis, and Literary 
Studies. It has used a variety of text features 
(e.g., lexical, ngram, syntactic, and 
orthographic).  Stylometric features may be 
extracted and clustered for a collection of texts 
to create "writeprints" for anonymous authors 
(e.g., Iqbal et el., 2010) or for problems of 
author identification or authentication. These 
approaches may be fruitfully combined with 
machine learning methods (Koppel, Schler & 
Argamon, 2009), such as support vector 
machines (SVMs; Diederich 2003; De Vel 2001; 
Li et al. 2006), neural networks (Merriam 
1995; Tweedie, Singh & Holmes, 1996; Zheng, 
Li, Huang & Chen, 2006), and decision trees 
(Apte et al 1998; Abbasi & Chen 2005).   
All these machine learning methods have 
also been successful in a distinct class of text 
analysis problems focusing on properties of the 
texts rather than properties of the authors; the 
most relevant problems are sentiment analysis 
and affect identification (Poria, Cambria & 
Gelbukh, 2015, Severyn & Moschitti, 2015, 
Teng et al. 2015). In this broader context, the 
success of neural networks, especially 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), is 
important. CNNs map word-level 
representations of sentences or documents into 
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fairly low-dimensional representations of the 
entire sentence or document.  They thus take 
into account, or try to take into account, the 
composition of word meanings into more 
complex messages. CNNs have been shown to 
be of significant help in sentiment analysis, 
although the shortcomings of a word-oriented 
approach have long been apparent in 
sentiment analysis, because diverse features of 
context may affect the final effect, such as 
when sarcasm is used. 
The particular problem of threat analysis 
can be viewed as combining the two 
approaches of author-oriented analysis and 
text-oriented analysis. The psychological 
profile of the author is a significant factor, as is 
the content of the message.  To this may be 
added a third component, identification of a 
particular kind of relationship, the predator-
prey relationship, between the author and 
addressee. In two out of three of these 
components, it is entirely possible that key 
information is not encoded in the message, and 
that extra-textual features such as that 
provided by an author profile may prove 
essential.  The multi-modal nature of the 
evidence is one respect in which the problem of 
threat assessment differs from many other text 
classification problems. Another is that a 
multiple component system trained to address 
the three components of the problem 
separately may have the best success because 
the architectures best suited to each problem 
are different. For example, the identification of 
personality types or author types seems to 
benefit from class-specific feature sets (Abbasi 
and Chen 2008, Poria et al. 2015). Finally, the 
best approach may be a "rating-based" 
approach that seeks to assign a numerical 
threat level (1-5). This is not simply a 5-class 
classification problem, since the training 
algorithm should exploit the fact that a 4 is 
closer to a 5 than to a 1. Thus the "metric 
labeling" technique of Pang and Lee (2005), 
which they apply to SVMs, may be of help. 
The process of factoring the problem into 
simpler parts, each of which may be its own 
more tractable machine learning problem, is 
productive. There are well known ensemble-
learning techniques for co-training such 
separate learners. Abbasi and Chen (2008) and 
Poria et al. (2015) provide good examples.  
One final point worth noting: An 
important component of the progress made in 
text classification over the last few years has 
been the increasing use of dimensionality 
reduction.  Dimensionality reduction has its 
mathematical roots in Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) and the closely related 
Singular Value Decomposition. PCA has been 
applied to authorship identification by using 
feature covariances over sliding text windows 
to compute author-specific patterns.  Recent 
work using neural net trained word vectors 
(Mikolov et al.  2013) has introduced another 
"deep learning"-based form of dimensionality 
reduction, and though the amount of data 
required to train such word embeddings takes 
us well beyond the size of any plausible 
forensically tagged dataset, various practical 
methods of adapting such vectors to specific 
tasks have been proposed. For example, Tang, 
Wei, Qin, Liu and Zhou (2014) proposed a 
method of training the vectors with sentiment 
tags, to learn sentiment-specific word vectors.  
Similarly, the work of Poria et al. and Severyn 
and Moschitti, cited above begins with the 
word2vec vectors trained by Mikolov et al., 
and uses CNNs to train a sentence level 
sentiment analyzer, in effect training up a set 
of contextually sensitive word features relevant 
to sentiment classification.  This provides some 
hope that deep learning may provide ways of 
detecting features of texts that have significant 
subtlety, including the many gradations of 
predator language, if we can supply the proper 
training sets. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Preliminary THReat Evaluation & Assessment of Discourse (THREAD) Index 
THREATS 
A. Feasibility: How capable is the threatener to carry out the threat fulfillment possible (e.g., threatening to bring 
on the plague is not very feasible, whereas spreading disparaging rumors is relatively feasible)? 
1. INFEASIBLE:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:FEASIBLE 
B. Capability/expertise: Is there evidence the threatener is able to carry out the threat? 
2. INCAPABLE:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:CAPABLE 
C. Extremity/intensity: How severe are the potential consequences or scope of harm to those threatened (e.g., a 
practical joke intended to embarrass is relatively minor, whereas threats to kill you and your family are relatively 
serious)? 
3. NEGLIGIBLE/MINOR:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:EXTREMELY SERIOUS 
4. SLIGHT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:INTENSE 
D. Self-efficacy: Does the threatener express confidence and a sense of self-efficacy in carrying out the threat? 
5. INSECURE:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:SELF-CONFIDENT 
6. UNCERTAIN:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:SELF-ASSURED 
E. Prior efficacy: Is there evidence that the threatener has issued, and followed through with, prior relevant 
threats? 
7. INEXPERIENCED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:EXPERIENCED 
F. Linguistic Conditionality: Is the threat phrased provisionally with highly conditional probability in the verb 
phrases and contingency phrases (e.g., this “may” or “might” happen) or with highly certain and probable types 
of phrases (e.g., this “will” or “absolutely is going to” happen)? 
8. IMPROBABLE PHRASING:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:PROBABLE PHRASING 
9. UNCERTAIN PHRASING:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:CERTAIN PHRASING 
G. Immediacy/imminence: What is the time horizon of the language and implied harm (threatening to make you 
regret something in your future seems off in the distance, whereas threatening to show up tonight is relatively 
immediate)? 
10. DISTANT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:IMMEDIATE 
11. NON-URGENT/NON-IMMINENT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:URGENT/IMMINENT 
H. Knowledge of target: How much information and/or insight into the target/victim is manifest in the threat? 
12. UNACQUAINTED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:ACQUAINTED 
13. IGNORANT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:KNOWLEDGEABLE 
I. Inclusion of others: Are others, such as relevant or mutual children, pets, family, etc., included in the threat? 
14. EXCLUSIVE TO TARGET: 1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:INCLUSIVE OF OTHERS 
J. Referential foci: Is the threat focused from a self-focus or perspective? Is there a vivid and/or repeated fixation 
on self vs. other, or one group against another? 
15. FOCUSED ON OTHER(S):_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:SELF-FOCUSED 
16. COLLECTIVELY FOCUSED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:FOCUSED ON US/THEM OR YOU-I 
K. Linguistic deviation: To what extent does the language diverge or differ from the language of the person or 
group being threatened? 
17. ACCOMMODATIVE LANGUAGE:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:DIVERGENT LANGUAGE 
L. Plan Complexity: How complicated is the expressed threat (are there many steps, rigid sequences of steps, or 
multiple endeavors required to carry out the threat, or is the threat relatively simple and straightforward. 
18. COMPLEX:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:SIMPLE 
19. CIRCUITOUS:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:STRAIGHTFORWARD 
M. Message Mode: Is the threat purely verbal, or are there also nonverbal (e.g., objects, visual elements such as 
drawings or photographs, etc.) components of the threat?  
20.  EXCLUSIVELY VERBAL:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:NONVERBAL AND/OR VERBAL 
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N. Goal-linking: Is there evidence in the language of higher-order goal linking of, or (inter)dependency on the 
target with threatener’s life objectives and/or values (e.g., “I can’t be happy without you,” “There is no one in 
the world for me but you,” etc.), or are the threats unlinked to the target person (e.g., “Bad things are going to 
happen”)? 
21. UNLINKED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:LINKED 
22. INDEPENDENT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:(INTER)DEPENDENT 
O. Identification fixation: To what extent do words or phrases indicate fixation, preoccupation, and 
personal identity fusion with a topic, entity, or person? 
23. DIFFUSED IDENTITY:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:PREOCCUPIED IDENTITY 
P. Coherence/organization: is there evidence that the threatener has engaged in planning, preparation, and/or has 
an overall organizing vision of implementing the threat, or is the threat disorganized, chaotic, and ill thought 
out? 
24. INCOHERENT:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:COHERENT 
25. DISORGANIZED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:CHAOTIC 
Q. Sentiment deterioration: Is there an increase in, or degree of emphasis on speech with increasingly negative, 
anger-based terminology? 
26. AFFECT NEUTRAL OR BALANCED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:INCREASINGLY ANGRY 
R. Delusional content: Does the content suggest psychoses or lack of mental competence (are there indications of 
unrealistic visions, conspiracy theories, illusions, fantasies, or other psychotic content)? 
27. DELUSIONAL:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:ACTUALITY 
28. FANTASTICAL:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:GROUNDED 
S. Embeddedness: Are the threats embedded in a broader manifesto, or isolated fragmented thoughts or 
outbursts? 
29. FRAGMENTED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:PHILOSPHICALLY EMBEDDED 
30. ISOLATED:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:IDEOGICALLY EMBEDDED 
T. Finality fantasies: Are there “end-game,” suicide fantasies or images, suggested (e.g., “If I can’t have you, no one 
can,” “I’ll take you and me down together,” “It will all end soon”), or is the language more optimistic (e.g., “Life 
would be so wonderful with you in it,” “I believe we would make the most amazing couple,” etc.)? 
31. HOPEFUL:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:HOPELESS 
32. ENCOURAGING:_1_:_2_:_3_:_4_:_5_:_6_:_7_:FATALISTIC 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: Respond to the next 5 items on a 7-point scale from: 
STRONGLY DISAGREE (0) to STRONGLY AGREE (7) 
Holistic Credibility Rating: 
33. The speaker presents a credible threat. 
34. The speaker intends to carry out their threat. 
35. The speaker is likely to carry out their threat. 
36. The speaker seems determined to do something harmful to someone or something. 
 
Holistic Danger Rating: 
37. The speaker seems dangerous. 
38. I would be afraid (i.e., experience fear) if I received this message. 
39. The speaker appears to be preparing to do something violent. 
40. I view this as a serious and/or imminent threat. 
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Holistic Threat Ranking: 
0 = Not a serious threat 
1 = A minor threat 
2 = A serious but not imminent threat 
3 = An imminent and severe threat 
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